What works to improve the quality of student learning in developing countries? by Masino, S. et al.
International Journal of Educational Development 48 (2016) 53–65What works to improve the quality of student learning in developing
countries?
Serena Masino a, Miguel Nin˜o-Zarazu´a b,*
aOxford Department of International Development (ODID), University of Oxford, United Kingdom
bUnited Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), Helsinki, Finland
A R T I C L E I N F O
Article history:
Available online 23 December 2015
JEL classiﬁcation:
I25
I28
I38
C10
O50
Keywords:
Education quality
Student learning
Education policy
Developing countries
Systematic review
A B S T R A C T
We conducted a systematic review to identify policy interventions that improve education quality and
student learning in developing countries. Relying on a theory of change typology, we highlight three
main drivers of change of education quality: (1) supply-side capability interventions that operate
through the provision of physical and human resources, and learning materials; (2) policies that through
incentives seek to inﬂuence behaviour and intertemporal preferences of teachers, households, and
students; (3) bottom-up and top-down participatory and community management interventions, which
operate through decentralisation reforms, knowledge diffusion, and increased community participation
in the management of education systems. Overall, our ﬁndings suggest that interventions are more
effective at improving student performance and learning when social norms and intertemporal choices
are factored in the design of education policies, and when two or more drivers of change are combined.
Thus, supply-side interventions alone are less effective than when complemented by community
participation or incentives that shift preferences and behaviours.
 2015 UNU-WIDER. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Since the seminal work of Becker (1962) and Schultz (1961) on
the theory of human capital, education policy has been increas-
ingly the object of research, for its intrinsic importance but also for
its instrumental value in the improvement of society. Theoretical
economic models have emphasised the role of schooling in
determining the returns to education that ultimately foster
economic growth (Lucas, 1988; Becker et al., 1990; Rebelo,
1991; Romer, 1994). Empirical studies show that education and
the policies that facilitate the process of innovation and knowledge
creation have profound effects on the long-run economic growth
and development patterns (Barro, 1991; Rebelo, 1991; Benhabib
and Spiegel, 1994; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1998). The beneﬁts of
information and knowledge diffusion in facilitating economic
transactions, productive arrangements, social interactions, and
political participation are also widely acknowledged (Sen, 1999).
Investing in human capital through education policy has been a
growing priority for developing countries since the post war era,
and such efforts are often supported by foreign aid. During the* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: miguel@wider.unu.edu (M. Nin˜o-Zarazu´a).
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4.0/).1970s and 1980s, and with many African nations achieving
independence from colonial powers, much of the education aid
focused on improving access to education via supply-side policies,
such as the construction of schools and the provision of equipment
(Coombs, 1985; Tilak, 1988). These policies were expected to lead
to enhanced productivity, economic growth, and development. In
addition, improving teaching abilities via training of teachers and
reforming learning materials was funded as an effective way of
enhancing education quality (World Bank, 1980). During that
period, around 50% of all bilateral co-operation aid went to
secondary education, and nearly a third to tertiary and technical
education. These sectors were, in fact, regarded as catalytic for
growth and development (OECD, 2012). It was not until the late
1980s that education aid and public policies began to shift towards
improving access to primary education, as the latter was
recognised to have the highest economic returns in developing
countries (Psacharopoulos, 1981, 1985; Psacharopoulos et al.,
1986; Petrakis and Stamatakis, 2002; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos,
2004; Asiedu and Nandwa, 2007). The shift was followed, in 1990,
by the World Declaration on ‘Education for All’, adopted by the
United Nations Educational Scientiﬁc and Cultural Organisation
(UNESCO) and other multilaterals and more recently by the current
formulation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), where
access to education represents a cornerstone for expanding humane under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
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become the dominant paradigm of education aid in the developing
world (see Riddell and Nin˜o-Zarazu´a, 2016).
More recently, the education aid policy debate has gradually
shifted from access to schooling to improving learning quality. The
transition is likely to dominate the post-2015 global development
framework for education development, and can be explained by
two important factors: ﬁrstly, growing evidence emphasises that
quality of education is what matters for economic development.
Hanushek and Kimko (2000) and Barro (2001), for example, ﬁnd
that test scores are better predictors of real per capita GDP growth
than years of schooling attainment. Hanushek and Woessmann
(2008, 2012), Hanushek et al. (2010), Jamison et al. (2007), Laurini
and Andrade (2012), and UNESCO (2011), among others, show that
cognitive skills are more strongly associated with increases in
earnings and development outcomes than schooling attainment.
The second factor is the recognition that poor quality of
education remains endemic in developing countries. UNESCO
(2014) reports that 250 million children are functionally illiterate
and innumerate despite 50% of them having spent at least four
years in school. Similarly, in India, more than half of all grade ﬁve
students’ reading ability stands at grade two level (ASER, 2015).
Teacher qualiﬁcations and attendance is equally problematic with
less than 75% of primary school teachers in developing countries
being trained according to national standards (UNESCO, 2014).
Along the same lines, Glewwe et al. (2010) report that teachers
from rural schools in Kenya were absent 20% of the time; while, in
Zambia and Pakistan, teachers were absent, respectively, 18 and
10% of the time (Das et al., 2004; Reimers, 1993). Other supply-side
concerns such as overcrowded classrooms, lack of teaching
material, and poor infrastructure are also obstacles for good
learning environments. In sub-Saharan Africa, the rapid increase in
school enrolment rates accompanied by low teacher recruitment
means that the pupil-teacher ratios in primary education is now
exceeding 40:1 (UNESCO, 2014). Demand-side factors such as
discriminatory social norms, group incentive dynamics, and
intertemporal choices can also inﬂuence the utilisation of
education services.
Previous analytical review studies have examined the relation-
ship between policy design and cognitive skills and learning at
various levels of education, while focusing largely on supply-side
interventions (Glewwe, 2002; Kremer, 2003; Glewwe and Kremer,
2006; Kremer and Holla, 2009; Glewwe et al., 2014). Recent
systematic reviews have focused on a number of issues including
(i) assessing the effectiveness of policies that improve enrolment
in primary schools (Petrosino et al., 2012); (ii) supply-side and
demand-side factors in school attendance and learning (Krishnar-
atne et al., 2013); (iii) school-based interventions looking
exclusively at the evidence from randomised control trials
(McEwan, 2014) and (iv) studies with a speciﬁc regional focus
(Conn, 2014). This study contributes to the existing debate by
conducting a systematic review of the literature on education
policies that speciﬁcally target the quality of student learning at
basic education level in developing countries. In line with this
focus, we decided to consider test scores and depart from the
examination of outcomes such as school enrolment and attain-
ment, pupil-teacher ratios, drop-out rates, and repetition rates. The
choice is motivated by the fact that mere indicators of enrolment
and attainment do not necessarily capture the quality of the
delivered education, and the level of students’ achievement
(UNESCO, 2014). Our study collects evidence from experimental
and quasi-experimental studies, and, overall, our ﬁndings suggest
that interventions are more effective at improving student
performance and learning when social norms and intertemporal
choices are factored in the design of education policies; and when
a combination of policy approaches is adopted. We conclude thatsupply-side interventions are less effective alone than when
complemented by community participation interventions or by
incentives that shift preferences and behaviours.
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2
presents a theory of change typology, outlining the drivers that
facilitate improvements in education quality in developing
countries, while Section 3 presents the systematic review
methodology. Section 4 presents the synthesis of evidence, which
is divided into three groups: (i) supply-side capability interven-
tions, (ii) incentives for changing preferences and behaviours, and
(iii) participatory and community management interventions.
Finally, Section 5 concludes by discussing the ﬁndings and drawing
some possible policy implications.
2. Policy innovations to improve education quality and student
learning: a theory of change typology
We begin the discussion by developing a theory of change
typology based on the systematic review. The theory of change
involved, ﬁrst, the identiﬁcation of the targeted outcome, which in
our case is student achievement as measured by test scores in
reading, writing and mathematics. Secondly, the theory of change
identiﬁed various transmission channels through which policy
strategies impact education quality in developing country con-
texts. Typically, a variety of interlinked factors affect the desirable
outcomes overtime. Therefore, it was important to disentangle the
short-term from the medium and long-term objectives that also
inﬂuence targeting mechanisms and the process of impact
evaluation of policies.
From the systematic review analysis, we were able to identify
three main drivers of change for advancing education quality and
student learning in developing countries (see Fig. 1). These consist
of (i) interventions aiming to enhance the supply-side capabilities
of education institutions, (ii) interventions targeting supply-side
and demand-side changes in preferences and behaviours that
affect the utilisation of education services, and (iii) bottom-up and
top-down participation and management interventions. In the
following sections we discuss these drivers of change in more
detail.
2.1. Supply-side capability interventions
Supply-side interventions aim to raise student achievements
by targeting infrastructure or organisational deﬁciencies through,
for example, improving physical infrastructure, providing teaching
materials, and training and hiring extra teachers. Financial
resources provided by governments and/or aid-funded pro-
grammes can take the form of directed or generalised ﬁnancial
allocations to improve physical conditions of existing schools (as
in Paqueo and Lopez-Acevedo, 2003; Bjorkman, 2004; Barrera-
Osorio, 2007) or involve the construction of new schools (as in
Burde and Linden, 2013). Other studies have also examined the
allocation of ﬁnancial resources to provide school materials such
as computers, ﬂip-charts and textbooks, which support the
learning process and improve teaching quality (see for example
Barrera-Osorio and Linden, 2009; Glewwe et al., 2004; Vermeersch
and Kremer, 2005; Glewwe et al., 2009; Evans et al., 2009; Banerjee
et al., 2007; Linden, 2008; He et al., 2008; Muralidharan and
Sundararaman, 2010).
Supply-side education policies have also focused on hiring extra
teachers, so as to decrease the prevailing high teacher-pupil ratios
in many developing countries, and also complement permanent
teachers with younger, often more motivated, temporary teachers
(see e.g. Duﬂo et al., 2015; Asadullah, 2005; Linden, 2008;
Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2011). Finally, supply-side
policies have also taken the form of management related
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Fig. 1. Theory of change ﬂow diagram.
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education systems as a whole (Garcı´a Palomer and Paredes, 2010;
King and Ozler, 2005; Galiani et al., 2008; Lassibille et al., 2010).
This type of interventions can be seen as cross-over policy between
resource-provision and participation-related drivers of change.
2.2. Incentives for changing preferences and behaviours
Monetary incentives have been used to produce changes in the
behaviour and preferences of agents involved both in the provision
and utilisation of education services, namely teachers, students
and parents. Incentives for teachers aim to improve the quality
of teaching whereas incentives for students and parents are
concerned more with behaviours and preferences that affect the
demand for, and utilisation of education services. Several studies
have, in fact, shown that, in contexts where the demand for
educational services is constrained by societal and economic
factors, supply physical and human resources alone can often
result in a waste of limited resources (Vermeersch and Kremer,
2005; Glewwe et al., 2009; Muralidharan and Sundararaman,
2010).
In this sense, teachers’ commitment to attend the classroom
regularly can depend on a number of factors, including the level of
wages and the nature of their contracts (permanent vs. temporary),
the distance to the workplace and school facilities, and the
existence of systems to monitor their work shifts and attendance.
In some contexts, the provision of monetary incentives can be
effective to discourage absenteeism. In others, teachers mayrespond better to non-monetary incentives, such as monitoring
and pay sanctions and other enforcement mechanisms. It has been
reported, however, that such policies sometimes fail to achieve
long-term improvements in students learning, by simply encour-
aging teachers to boost students’ short-term performance, so as to
meet the target to which the incentives are tied (see discussion
below on the studies of Rau and Contreras, 2009; Glewwe et al.,
2010; Kingdon and Teal, 2007; Duﬂo et al., 2012; Muralidharan and
Sundararaman, 2011).
Similarly, a number of strategies have been deployed targeting
the behaviours of students and their parents. Examples are the
Colombian school voucher programme PACES, analysed by Angrist
et al. (2002, 2006), or Chile’s school voucher scheme discussed by
Contreras (2001), Hsieh and Urquiola (2006), and Anand et al.
(2009). These aim to facilitate enrolment and attendance of low-
income students in better quality (often private) schools. School
vouchers work through two parallel mechanisms: ﬁrst, they
provide students with the ﬁnancial resources needed to attend
schools in more conducive environments. Second, they aim to
inﬂuence students’ intertemporal choices and inﬂuence the
allocation of time to education over labour supply.
Conditional cash transfers (CCTs), and merit-based scholarships
and grants are also designed to induce behavioural change towards
an increased utilisation of education services (Das et al., 2004;
Kremer et al., 2009; Baird et al., 2011). In those cases, the ﬁnancial
support is conditional upon, or tied to, student and household
behaviour including school attendance, grade progression, or
test score attainment. In this way, students’ choices are directly
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Fig. 2. Systematic review ﬂow diagram.
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often given larger income support than boys to compensate for
gender bias and normative discrimination (Nin˜o-Zarazu´a, 2011;
Martı´nez Franzoni and Voorend, 2012). Low-income and vulnera-
ble groups, including ethnic or religious minorities, are also
targeted by CCTs, as these groups are exposed to higher risk factors
for school dropouts (Heckman and LaFontaine, 2010; Suh and Suh,
2007). As depicted in Fig. 1, by coupling behavioural incentives
with ﬁnancial resources at the school level, school vouchers, CCTs,
and merit-based scholarships effectively cross-over the supply-
side of interventions.
2.3. Participatory and community management interventions
The third driver of change runs through bottom-up or top-down
participatory and community management interventions. On the
one hand, bottom-up policies diffuse and disseminate relevant
information among actors, to raise awareness of community needs
for quality education services and of possible solutions. Often such
initiatives, in combination with incentives to change preferences
and behaviours, seek to alter discriminatory social norms that
restrict demand for education services, particularly among girls
and vulnerable groups. Some examples of bottom-up interventions
have been studied in Jimenez and Sawada (1999) and Di Gropello
and Marshall (2005).
On the other hand, top-down interventions channel or optimise
resource deployment through management reforms and standards
of practice enforcement. These interventions are often comple-
mented by the provision of resources, while the community
participatory component serves to rationalise the service ﬂow of
the education system. Examples of such interventions are
discussed in King and Ozler (2005), Galiani et al. (2008), Garcı´a
Palomer and Paredes (2010), and Lassibille et al. (2010). Participa-
tory community management interventions can thus be seen as an
important complement to both supply and demand-side drivers of
change, insofar as they generate conducive environments for social
change.
3. Methodology
We conducted a systematic review of the literature on the
quality of student learning, following the Cochrane Handbook for
Systematic Reviews of Interventions (Higgins and Green, 2008)
and the PRISMA guidelines (Moher et al., 2009). The review is
based on the largest relevant databases available, including
Econlit, Social Science Citation Index, JSTOR, SCOPUS, Eldis, 3ie
database, J-PAL Library, and Google Scholar.
Search criteria included academic articles adopting a rigorous
quantitative impact evaluation design, that assessed the effective-
ness of policies targeting the improvement of education quality in
pre-school, primary, and secondary education, and which were
published in English. The search was restricted from 1990 onwards.
This is due, ﬁrstly, to a limited number of experimental or quasi-
experimental studies conducted before 1990. Secondly, 1990 is the
year when the World Declaration on Education for All was adopted
by UNESCO. The Declaration sparked considerable expansion in
research, as well as in funding and innovation of the education aid
architecture; this then paved way to the introduction of the MDGs
in 2000. In order to diminish the risk of publication bias, we
included unpublished studies (grey literature), such as working
papers. Non-academic policy documents such as policy briefs and
reports that lack rigorous methodology were excluded from the
review.
The search protocol was complemented with a hand search of
reference lists of previous review studies to identify additional
relevant material. The initial search was repeated at a later stage, inFebruary 2013, to update the review. To make the searching
process more efﬁcient, we combined a number of study ‘identiﬁers’
that included (i) research design (e.g. RCTs, randomised experi-
ment, randomised controlled trial, quasi-experimental method,
difference-in-differences, regression discontinuity design, match-
ing methods, instrumental variables, structural equation model-
ling), (ii) type of intervention (e.g. improved school infrastructure,
allocation of extra teachers, school meals, school fees, textbooks,
school vouchers, conditional cash transfers), (iii) outcomes (e.g.
reading, mathematics, and writing test scores), (iv) education level,
which was limited to primary and secondary education, and (v) the
context of intervention (e.g. rural vs. urban settings, developing
countries, Africa, Asia, Latin America, Middle East). Group
identiﬁers were combined with the Boolean operator ‘AND’, while
they were connected with the Boolean operator ‘OR’.
We selected 220 studies for screening on the basis of their
abstracts and keywords, out of 17,800 search hits of related
studies. Of the 220 studies, 146 were excluded due to methodo-
logical limitations, leaving 74 studies that were fully scrutinised on
the basis of their content; of these, 36 did not meet the eligibility
criteria in terms of outcomes, research design, or coverage. Finally,
in total, 38 studies were included for analysis in the systematic
review (see Fig. 2).
As the primary objective of this study is to review education
policies that improve the quality of learning of basic education
students in developing countries, we only included studies that
focused on student achievement test scores as impact outcomes.
As previously mentioned, we excluded other outcomes, such as
school enrolment and attainment, pupil-teacher ratios, drop-out
rates and repetition rates. This is due to the fact that test scores in
subjects such as mathematics and language are better proxies for
learning performance and achievement, while enrolment or
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quality. Test scores can be either administered by ofﬁcial
institutions that oversee students’ grade progression, or during
pre- and post-implementation phases of policies that are analysed
by researchers in the context of independent evaluations.
It is important to point out that there are a number of issues
regarding the comparability of student test scores across contexts,
learning subjects, and grades. For instance, student achievement
test scores for primary school levels do not reﬂect the same
cognitive progression of secondary school levels. Comparing the
two or pooling them together in the same analysis would yield
misleading conclusions. In addition, internationally comparable
test scores are available for a relative small number of
industrialised and middle income countries,1 but these are not
strictly comparable with most student achievement test scores
available in developing countries. The standardisation of measures,
via standard deviations (SD), can nevertheless help us compare the
effectiveness of policies across different types of contexts.
Following a programme or intervention, the standard deviation
indicates the amount of variation the latter produced in student
learning, compared to changes in learning observed in a control
group. A 0.2 SD change in test scores would amount to a child
moving from the 50th to the 58th percentile of her/his group test
score distribution. In the education literature, an increase of less
than 0.1 SD is typically considered to be a small effect, while an
increase of more than 0.3 SD is considered a large effect. An
increase of more than 0.5 SD is regarded as a very large effect
(Dhaliwal et al., 2012).
Therefore, this study only includes experimental or quasi-
experimental studies that use standard deviations of student
achievement test scores to measure policy impact. As explained,
this is done to render cross-country comparisons of policy impact
more meaningful; it does not, however, undermine the relevance
of other studies that have adopted qualitative methods of
research enquiry. The study also adopts a geographical inclusion
criterion by focusing on studies conducted in countries deﬁned as
low or middle-income by the World Bank’s Atlas classiﬁcation
system, which is based on gross national income (GNI) per
capita.2
Out of the 38 selected studies, 23 adopted experimental
designs, while the remaining 15 followed quasi-experimental
methods. The large number of recent studies included in the
review reﬂects the increasing interest in issues related to
education quality among the research community. With regard
to the geographical coverage, the review included studies
conducted in 15 countries located in three major geographical
regions: Central Asia (Afghanistan) and South-Asia (Bangladesh,
India); Latin America (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador,
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua), and sub-Saharan Africa (Kenya,
Madagascar, Malawi, Uganda, Zambia). No studies conducted in
Middle Eastern or North-African countries were identiﬁed, while
some studies in Central or East Asia did not meet the inclusion
criteria.
4. Synthesis of evidence
In this section, we discuss the synthesis of evidence, following
the policy classiﬁcation outlined in the theory of change presented
in Section 2. To summarise: the ﬁrst group of policies aims to1 For example, the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA).
2 Based on 2011 data on GNI per capita, developing countries were classiﬁed as
follows: low income countries were those with annual GNI per capita of US$1025 or
less; lower middle income countries were those with GNI per capita between $1026
and $4035; and upper middle income countries where those with GNI per capita in
the rage of $4036–12,475. For more information, see http://data.worldbank.org/
about/country-classiﬁcations.improve education quality through the strengthening of supply-
side capabilities of education systems via, for example, the
provision of computers and extra-teachers. The second group of
policies aims to inﬂuence individual preferences and behaviours
via the provision of incentives. This group of policies is further
divided into (i) supply-side incentives (e.g. payment incentive
schemes for teachers); (ii) demand-side incentives (e.g. merit-
based scholarship programmes), and (iii) supply-side plus
demand-side incentives (e.g. school voucher programmes and
CCTs). A third group of policies relies on participatory and
community interventions with the objective of improving the
management of education systems. Examples of these policies are
country-wide school decentralisation reforms and community
involvement programmes. A synthesis of evidence is presented in
Table A1 in Appendix A.
4.1. Supply-side capability interventions
A number of studies examine policies that provided additional
resources for schools and teachers, in an attempt to improve
education quality and student learning. Changes in outcomes
varied across contexts, but overall, the analysis suggests that it is
not sufﬁcient to limit policy strategies to the provision of supply-
side capabilities. For instance, Asadullah (2005) reports that in
Bangladesh secondary school achievement test scores were not
improved after reductions in class-size. The author attributed the
result to the lack of complementary learning materials and
teaching improvements. This is in line with what the ﬁndings of
the study by Jones (2016) in this Issue also indicates. Similarly,
Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2010) found that, in India,
teacher-aid tools, such as exam performance diagnostics, began to
produce positive effects only after they were complemented with
payment incentives tied to student achievement.
It appears that demand-side factors often undermine the
effectiveness of supply-side capability interventions. This was
particularly evident for policies that exclusively provided school
materials. In fact, some of these policies resulted in exclusion
errors, typically of the weakest students. For example, the Mexican
compensatory programme (PARE) analysed in Paqueo and Lopez-
Acevedo (2003) aimed to improve access to, and quality of, schools
in the four poorest Mexican states, by providing ﬁnancial
resources. But the adopted top-down targeting mechanism failed
to reach the poorest students. Similarly, the textbook distribution
intervention analysed in Glewwe et al. (2009) only increased the
performance of the strongest and often better-off students, while
poorer students were unable to properly understand books written
in English. Other interventions failed to produce signiﬁcant gains
in student learning because key complementary resources were
needed before inputs such as ﬂip-charts could result in signiﬁcant
learning improvement (Glewwe et al., 2004).
Nevertheless, a group of supply-side capability interventions
did succeed in raising student achievement test scores. For example,
the PACE-A programme analysed in Burde and Linden (2013), which
involved the construction of village-based community schools in
rural north-western Afghanistan, produced a very sizable effect on
both boys’ and girls’ school test scores. The main channel through
which the programme had an impact was the reduced transaction
costs in terms of distance and travelling time pupils had to spend
to attend traditional public schools, which are usually located
further away from rural communities. Additional positive evidence
from supply-side interventions came from Kenya, where school
meals and school uniforms improved students’ performance
(Vermeersch and Kremer, 2005; Evans et al., 2009). Vermeersch
and Kremer (2005) specify, however, that the gains were mainly
due to an induced increased attendance, rather than the result of
improvements in cognitive abilities through nutritional intake.
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civil-service contract teachers hired by parent-teacher associations
increased test scores only for those students that were assigned
to the new teachers, which seems to be explained by contract
teachers often using more effort than permanent teachers, in order
to get promoted to receive a permanent contract. For the students
assigned to regular pre-existing teachers, the reduced class size
resulting from the hiring of extra teachers did not translate in any
sizable positive effect on performance. This is consistent with the
evidence reported in Asadullah (2005) and Jones (2016) in this
Issue.
A number of recent studies have examined whether teaching
quality could be enhanced through compensatory or ‘remedial’
education schemes, or through new teaching methods such as
ﬂashcards and computer assisted learning. The outcomes of such
programmes are generally positive, with gains in both maths
and language test scores. Something that emerged in more than
one study is that, when interventions substitute teachers’ inputs,
their efﬁcacy was lower than when they complemented them
(Linden, 2008; He et al., 2009). For example, the study by
Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011) found that, although
providing extra schooling materials helped improve student
performance, supplying additional contract teachers was a
more effective policy to improve the quality of learning.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of remedial education schemes
was found to be largely driven by the lowest performing pupils
who seemed to have beneﬁted the most from the programmes
(Banerjee et al., 2007; He et al., 2008). On the contrary, self-
paced computer assisted learning programmes, like the one
analysed in He et al. (2008), were found to help stronger
students the most.
4.2. Incentive for changing preferences and behaviours
We ﬁnd that, contrary to supply-side capability interventions,
incentive policies targeting preferences and behaviours have been
extensively implemented at secondary school levels. This seems to
reﬂect programme design features intended to induce shifts in
individual and household behaviour and preferences, particularly
at the time when the opportunity cost of schooling for low income
households begins to increase. Incentive policies have focused on
supply-side constraints of education systems and/or demand-side
constraints.
4.2.1. Supply-side incentives
Pay incentives for teachers have been implemented with the
aim of improving teacher attendance and performance. Results
are mixed: in Chile, pay-incentive tournaments were introduced
in secondary schools. The scheme provided monetary incentives
to teachers who improved the performance of secondary school
students over the course of a year. However, the gains in test scores
were only short-lived and likely to be the outcome of teachers’
opportunistic behaviour, whose actions were primarily motived by
the goal of succeeding in the tournament, and not achieving long-
term content-based improvements (Rau and Contreras, 2009).
Similar evidence has emerged from a teacher pay-incentive
programme introduced in Kenyan primary schools. As in the
Chilean case, it was found that the gains in test scores were
the result of teachers’ short-term opportunistic behaviour to
secure the pay reward (Glewwe et al., 2010).
Other similar interventions reported more positive results but
only after they had been combined with monitoring and
enforcement devices. In India, for example, Duﬂo et al. (2012)
found positive test score effects, which were the result of both pay-
incentives and increased monitoring on teachers’ attendance. Also
in India, Kingdon and Teal (2007) found that pay incentives raisedstudent achievement test scores only in private schools. The results
appeared to be associated with the nature of contractual
arrangements of Indian public schools, where teachers enjoy,
unlike in private schools, permanent contracts that diminish the
potential effect of pay incentives. Muralidharan and Sundararaman
(2011) also found that both individual and group pay incentives
raised test scores, although individual incentives were more
effective, with spillovers effects having an impact on test scores in
non-incentive subjects. This indicates that complementary poli-
cies, such as attendance monitoring and sanction enforcement,
together with case-speciﬁc contractual provisions, may inﬂuence
the effectiveness of pay incentives to improve education quality
and learning.
4.2.2. Demand-side incentives
Demand-side behavioural incentives have been found to
achieve positive impacts on school learning in sub-Saharan
African countries, although with some caveats. A Kenyan merit-
based scholarship programme, which awarded primary school
girls with funds to progress to secondary education, was not only
effective in improving student performance but also generated
positive spillover effects among boys (Kremer et al., 2009). Other
studies have revealed speciﬁc factors that enhance or limit the
effectiveness of such policies. For example, Nguyen (2008) found
that a cost effective way to increase test scores in Madagascar
was to provide students and their parents with statistics on
returns to investment in education. Provision of role models was,
however, only effective at improving poor students’ performance
when the role model was herself from a poor background. Das
et al. (2004) found, in Zambia, that test score gains were only
produced by cash transfers which were not anticipated by
households. The result was associated with the fact that
anticipated grants generated resource substitution and re-
distribution effects, which meant that a share of the resources
were taken away from students who obtained the grant and were
re-allocated for other intra-household purposes. Related to this
ﬁnding, the study conducted by Baird et al. (2011) among
secondary school girls in Malawi found that conditional cash
transfers were more effective than unconditional cash transfers
in improving student achievement test scores. The results
stressed the role of conditionalities in inﬂuencing household
inter-temporal preferences and decisions that affected the
utilisation of education services.
4.2.3. Supply-side plus demand-side incentives
We also identiﬁed policies that combine supply-side capability
interventions with behavioural incentives. Examples of this type of
policies are vouchers programmes, which have been extensively
implemented in Latin America. These programmes offer, on the
one hand, monetary incentives for poor students to attend private
schools that often have better records of teaching performance,
and on the other hand, provide schools with the necessary
resources to cover the increased demand for education services.
Angrist et al. (2002) and Angrist et al. (2006) report positive
impacts of the Colombian school voucher programme (PACES)
implemented in secondary schools. The renewal of grants is
conditional upon satisfactory students’ performance. Evidence
suggests that the programme raised test scores both in the short
term (Angrist et al., 2002) and in the longer term (Angrist et al.,
2006; Barrera-Osorio, 2007). In Chile, a similar voucher pro-
gramme was analysed by Contreras (2001), Hsieh and Urquiola
(2006) and Anand et al. (2009). The evidence, in this case was
inconclusive: while Contreras (2001) ﬁnds a positive impact, Hsieh
and Urquiola (2006) report a decrease in test scores. Following the
decision of some Chilean private schools to charge a fee on top of
the government voucher, Anand et al. (2009) analysed the test
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attend those schools. They found that, while students who were
awarded scholarships performed better than the ones in public
schools, no difference existed between the performance of
scholarship-funded students and that of students attending free
private voucher schools.
The study carried out in Mexico by Behrman et al. (2015)
implemented a three component intervention, where pay incen-
tives were given to students only, to teachers only, or to both and
also to schools’ administrative staff. The ﬁrst two treatments
rewarded individual performance whereas the third was designed
to elicit collaboration through group performance. The policy was
designed to impact multiple levels of the education system. While
incentives to students only were marginally effective in improving
student learning achievements, the intervention suffered from
extensive cheating on the part of students. The teacher-only pay
incentives were, instead, mostly ineffective. The biggest impact
was, however, that of the combined incentive scheme which
rewarded not only individual performance but also increased
performance of groups. The authors report cheating-adjusted
estimates to account for bias, but what the study highlights is the
importance of carefully assessing the dynamics of such beha-
vioural patterns when examining performance-related reward
schemes.
4.3. Participatory and community management interventions
Participatory and community management interventions in-
volve bottom-up and top-down policies which, by diffusing
knowledge among local communities, parent-teacher associations,
and parent committees, raise awareness, and increase participation
and involvement in the management of education systems.
Examples of bottom-up policy strategies are the EDUCO community
involvement scheme in El Salvador, analysed in Jimenez and Sawada
(1999), and the PROHECO participation initiative in Honduras,
analysed in Di Gropello and Marshall (2005). Both interventions
resulted in improved student achievement test scores.
Top-down approaches are more commonly implemented by
government education agencies to improve the management and
operational inefﬁciencies of education systems. Examples of these
policies are the Nicaraguan and Argentinian decentralisation
reforms, analysed in King and Ozler (2005) and Galiani et al.
(2008) respectively. Other examples are the multi-level decentral-
isation programme in Madagascar analysed, in Lassibille et al.
(2010), and the Chilean programme that transferred low-income
students to schools reporting best management standards of
practice (Garcı´a Palomer and Paredes, 2010). These studies report
mixed results: while Garcı´a Palomer and Paredes (2010) found
positive test score gains for students allocated to better managed
schools, Galiani et al. (2008) found that test score gains resulting
from the Argentinian decentralisation reform failed to reach the
poorest students (Galiani et al., 2008). Autonomy in decision
making at school level, following the decentralisation reform inNicaragua, could not explain the increases in test scores either, just
the de facto existence of autonomous management practices (King
and Ozler, 2005). Similarly, the study by Lassibille et al. (2010), in
Madagascar, did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant impact of decentralisation
on exam scores.
5. Conclusions
This study has reviewed the available evidence on education
policy to identify what works to improve the quality of student
learning in developing countries. The review has focused on
experimental and quasi-experimental studies of policies that
were funded by national governments alone and/or with the
support of donors. We have identiﬁed three drivers of change that
improve, under certain conditions, student achievement perfor-
mance and learning. The ﬁrst driver of change is related to
supply-side elements of education systems, through the provi-
sion of additional material and human resources. The second
driver of change is associated with supply-side and demand-side
factors that inﬂuence behaviours, and intertemporal choices of
teachers, students, and households. The third driver of change is
channelled through bottom-up and top-down participatory and
community management strategies, via decentralisation reforms,
and with the involvement of communities in the school system
management.
The evidence reviewed suggests that interventions are more
successful when two or more drivers of change are combined.
Often, the mere provision of physical and human resources is
ineffective at improving education quality, as unattended demand-
related factors can undermine the full utilisation of education
services. Therefore, intertemporal choices and discriminatory
social norms need to be factored in when designing education
policies. Whenever demand for education is generated via
community involvement or behavioural incentive programmes,
the review of the available evidence suggests that it is crucial to
upgrade simultaneously both infrastructure and administrative
capabilities of education systems, in order to accommodate the
increased demand for education without undermining quality. The
growing literature on education policy based on experimental and
quasi-experimental methods has helped us to better understand
the underlying mechanisms at play in effective policy implemen-
tation. However, more work is still needed to examine the full costs
and social beneﬁts of these interventions, and assess the long term
impacts of various types of education policies. This will require
extending the focus of analysis beyond experimental and quasi-
experimental research designs, to provide a more informed
discussion for future education policy strategies in developing
countries.
Appendix A
See Table A1.
Table A1
Synthesis of evidence.
Study Setting Funding Study design Study size Intervention Policy outcome
Supply-side capability interventions
Paqueo and Lopez-Acevedo
(2003)
Mexico (urban and rural);
Primary (grade 6)
Government RCT 897
(indigenous)
1024 (rural)
1480 (urban)
1921 (pooled
rural-
indigenous)
Supply-side education
programme (PARE) aiming to
reduce inequality and improve
quality of primary education in
4 poorest Mexican states
(a) Rural sector: test scores in Spanish
improved for all, but more so for less poor
students. When pooling indigenous and rural
samples, poorest students’ scores increase by
only half that of less poor students overall
(b) Urban sector: inconclusive results due to
experimental implementation problems
Barrera-Osorio (2007) Colombia (urban);
Secondary (grade 10)
Foreign Aid and
Government
Quasi-
experimental
analysis(propensity score
matching)
37,300
‘Concession Schools’
programme (publicly
subsidised private schools)
Maths and reading scores
increased by 2.4% and 4%
respectively
Barrera-Osorio and Linden
(2009)
Colombia (urban); Primary
and Secondary (grade 3–9)
Government RCT 5201 Integration of computers into
language teaching in public
schools
Small average treatment effect of about 0.11 SD
About a third of the students only used
computers for IT training rather than
incorporating its use into routine language and
maths classes
Bjorkman (2004) Uganda (nation-wide);
Primary (grade 7)
Government Quasi
experimental
analysis (D-i-D)
96 (districts) Government funded per-
student capitation grant
Test scores in treatment district which had
more exposure to grant were 0.42 SD higher
Glewwe et al. (2004) Kenya (urban and rural);
Primary (grade 6–8)
Foreign Aid RCT 141,698 Flip-chart provision in primary
schools
Flip chart provision did not result in any
signiﬁcant increase in test scores
Vermeersch and Kremer
(2005)
Kenya (rural); Pre-Primary Foreign Aid RCT 1326–1350 Subsidised school meals
provision
Test scores increased by 0.40 SD only in schools
with better trained teachers. No effect on
cognitive abilities, suggesting gains not a
nutritional effect but increased attendance
incentives explain score gains
Glewwe et al. (2009) Kenya (rural); Primary
(grade 3–8)
Foreign Aid RCT 7354–12,663 Textbook provision Textbooks did not increase average scores but
only test scores of the strongest students.
Weaker students could not read the books as
English is most often their third language
Evans et al. (2009) Kenya (rural); Primary
(grade 1–4)
Foreign Aid RCT 582 School uniforms provision Students’ test scores increase on average by
0.25 SD
Duﬂo et al. (2015) Kenya (rural); Primary
(grade 1)
Foreign Aid RCT 6531 Extra contract teacher hired by
parent-teacher associations
(and reduced class size)
Test scores only increased for children assigned
to new contract teacher. For the remaining
children in consequently reduced (by half)
classes, no gains take place
Burde and Linden (2013) Afghanistan (rural);
Primary (grade 1–8)
Foreign Aid RCT,
complemented
by IVs
estimation
1374 Effect of village-based
community-schools provision
on test scores and (indirectly)
effect of reducing distance to
school on test scores
Attending village-based schools raises test
scores by 0.51 SD overall (with stronger impact
on girls and on children who would not attend
village-based schools without treatment).
Reducing school distance by 1 mile improves
scores by 0.15 SD (boys) to 0.24 SD (girls).
Asadullah (2005) Bangladesh (nation-wide)
Secondary (grade 11)
Government Quasi-
experimental
analysis(regression
discontinuity design)
2165
Effect of class size reduction
(following discontinuous
rule) on student test scores
Smaller class size does not
affect test scores, possibly
due to secondary school
students being less
sensitive to this. Or because
class size only matters
when coupled with
adequate infrastructure
and teacher quality
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Banerjee et al. (2007) India (urban); Primary
(grade 3–4)
Foreign Aid RCT (a) 21,936
(b) 5523
(a) Remedial education in basic
literacy and numeracy skills
(b) Computer assisted learning
targeting maths skills
(a) Average test scores increased by 0.28 SD,
result driven by lowest performing children
(b) Maths test scores increased by 0.47 SD
Linden (2008) India (urban and rural);
Primary (grade 2–3)
Foreign Aid RCT 524 (in school
experiment)
1114 (out of
school
experiment)
Computer assisted learning, as
substitute (in school
experiment) or complement for
teacher (out of school
experiment)
CAL lowered maths scores by 0.57 SD when
implemented as a substitute for teachers, but
improved them by 0.28 SD when used as a
complement (the result is driven by weaker
students, whose scores increase by 0.40 SD)
He et al. (2008) India (urban and rural);
Primary (grade 1–5)
Foreign Aid RCT 4882–5327 New teaching methods (PicTalk
computer machine and
ﬂashcard games) to improve
teaching of foreign language
(English)
Scores are raised by 0.25–0.35 SD by both
games and computer-assisted learning. When
students’ own teachers delivered the
interventions, positive spillover raised maths
scores too and weaker students beneﬁted the
most. Stronger students beneﬁted more from
the self-paced computer assisted learning
method
He et al. (2009) India (urban); Pre-primary
and Primary (grade 1)
Foreign Aid RCT 1267–2824 Literacy skills school
programme (three types: in
school, out of school, and pre-
school)
Pre-school and out of school interventions
generated higher gains (0.55 SD and 0.70 SD,
respectively) compared to the in-school setting.
Highest gains where for ex-ante lowest
performing students
Muralidharan and
Sundararaman (2010)
India (rural); Primary
(grade 1–5)
Foreign Aid RCT 48,791 Provision of low cost diagnostic
feedback to teachers on
students’ performance
A supply-side intervention to provide feedback
diagnostic was not enough to generate teacher
incentives to improve students’ exam scores
(companion paper shows that coupled with pay
incentives diagnostic feedback provides
valuable input)
Muralidharan and
Sundararaman (2011)
India (rural); Primary
(grade 1–5)
Foreign Aid RCT 20,878 (maths)
21,049
(language)
Provision of extra contract
teachers
Test scores increased by 0.15 SD in maths and
0.13 SD in language. Intervention is particularly
beneﬁcial for students in 1st school year and in
remote schools
Muralidharan and
Sundararaman (2011)a
India (rural); Primary
(grade 1–5)
Foreign Aid RCT 12,255–14,797
(maths)
12,410–14,963
(language)
Provision of an extra contract
teacher and extra schooling
materials
Provision of extra resources raised test scores
by 0.10 SD on average, which is 0.13 SD lowers
than the average increase in test scores caused
by the pay incentive scheme
Incentives for changing preferences and behaviours
Angrist et al. (2002) Colombia (urban);
Secondary (grade 6–8)
Foreign Aid and
Government
RCT 282 PACES vouchers funding low
income students’ private
secondary education (grant
renewal conditional on
students’ performance)
Lottery winners scored on average 0.20 SD
higher on standardised tests. With larger
disaggregated effects for girls than boys.
Angrist et al. (2006) Colombia (nation-wide);
Secondary (grade 10)
Foreign Aid and
Government
Natural
experiment
(censored
Tobit, non-
parametric
bounds)
3541 PACES vouchers funding low
income students’ private
education (grant renewal
conditional on performance)
Maths and reading scores increased by 0.20 SD.
Positive effects go beyond the incentive not to
fail tests, gains are also reﬂected in increased
school choice incentives
Contreras (2001) Chile (nation-wide);
Secondary (grade 10)
Government Quasi-
experimental
analysis (two
stage least
squares)
56,200 (male)
62,900(female)
School Voucher System
(publicly subsidised private
schools)
Average (language-maths) increase of 102 test
points for male and 86 test points for female
students
Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) Chile (nation-wide);
Primary and Secondary
(grade 4 and 8)
Government Cross-sectional
and IV analysis
84 (schools) Government voucher scheme
allowing any student wishing
to do so to move from a public
to a private school
The reform did not translate in positive
achievement gains: maths test scores
decreased. The only tangible result has been a
middle class exodus from public schools
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TableA1 (Continued )
Study Setting Funding Study design Study size Intervention Policy outcome
Anand et al. (2009) Chile (urban); Primary
(grade 4)
Government Quasi-
experimental
analysis(propensity score
matching)
14,036
Scholarship provision to low
income students attending
private voucher school which
charge fees on top of the
voucher
Low income students
attending fee-charging
private schools thanks to a
scholarship score 0.20 SD
higher than those attending
public schools, but score no
higher than low income
students attending free
private voucher schools
Rau and Contreras (2009) Chile (nation-wide);
Primary and Secondary
(grade 4, 8, 10)
Government Quasi-
experimental
analysis(regression
discontinuity design and D-i-D
matching)
955–1740
Teacher pay incentives to raise
test scores (assessment of
tournament competition
vs. ‘gift-exchange’ effect)
Competing in a tournament
for pay incentive
assignment raised test
scores. But after winning,
teachers do not act upon
reception of the bonus in a
way that maintains the
score gains (e.g. out of
gratitude)
Behrman et al. (2015) Mexico (nation-wide,
mostly rural); Upper
Secondary (grade 10–12)
Government RCT 11,300–17,800 ALI: Individual student and
teacher pay incentive schemes;
and combined incentive
scheme to students, teachers
and school administrative staff
for both individual and group
performance improvement.
Teacher incentive pay scheme were not
effective on their own, while student pay
incentive scheme were (0.2–0.3 SD gain). The
biggest impact was, however, that of the
combined incentive scheme which rewarded
not only individual performance but also
increased performance of groups (0.3–0.6 SD
gain). Estimates are adjusted as cheating
proved to be substantial.
Das et al. (2004) Zambia (urban and rural);
Primary (grade 5–6)
Government Natural
experiment
and IV analysis
164 (schools) Anticipated vs. unanticipated
cash transfers for school
attendance
Maths and language test scores increase more
when cash transfers are unanticipated by
households. This is because anticipated grants
lead to substitution effect of resources
Nguyen (2008) Madagascar (rural);
Primary (grade 4)
Foreign Aid and
Government
RCT 11,659
(students)
Provision of statistic
information on education
earning returns and/or role
models
Providing statistics raises scores by 0.20 SD on
average, with an impact as high as 0.37 SD for
students underestimating returns prior to RCT.
Rolemodels only increased scores when of low-
income background (0.17 SD); with a higher
impact on poorer students (0.27 SD)
Kremer et al. (2009) Kenya (rural); Primary
(grade 5–6)
Foreign Aid RCT 1153–3602
(pooled
sample)
768–2106
(Busia)
385–1496
(Teso)
Merit based scholarship award
to fund secondary school
progression for girls
Girls’ test score increased by between 0.20 and
0.30 SD in Busia district. There is inconclusive
evidence with regards to Teso. The impact also
had spillover effects on boys’ score increases
and on test scores of girls who were not
awarded the scholarship.
Glewwe et al. (2010) Kenya (rural); Primary
(grade 4–8)
Foreign Aid RCT 15,641 Teacher pay incentive scheme
tied to students’ performance
in exams
Test scores increased ad-hoc to achieve pay rise
(ability to answer MCQs and ﬁlling the gaps
questions). Thus, only test taking skills
improved but no impact on content learning
Baird et al. (2011) Malawi (urban and rural);
Secondary (grade 5–8)
Foreign Aid RCT 2057 Conditional vs. Unconditional
Cash Transfer Schemes
Test scores are 0.14 SD higher in English,
0.12 SD higher in maths and 0.17 SD higher in
overall cognitive abilities for girls who received
the conditional cash transfer
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Kingdon and Teal (2007) India (urban); Secondary
(grade 8)
Government Cross-sectional
and quasi-
experimental
analysis (IV)
360–542 Teacher pay incentive in private
vs. public schools
A 22% increase in test scores follows an increase
in teacher pay from 1 SD below to 1 SD above
the mean. This is only found in private schools,
as a result of increased teacher effort (as public
school contracts are mostly permanent in India,
pay incentives do not generate effort increases
in that context)
Duﬂo et al. (2012) India (rural); Informal
learning centres (primary)
Foreign Aid RCT 1760–1893 Teacher pay incentive and
monitoring scheme to reduce
absenteeism
A year after the intervention test scores were
0.17 SD higher. Gains are the results of both
incentives and increased monitoring
Muralidharan and
Sundararaman (2011)a
India (rural); Primary
(grade 1–5)
Foreign Aid RCT 12,255–14,797
(maths)
12,410–14,963
(language)
Individual teacher pay
incentive scheme and group
teacher pay incentive scheme
(school-level)
The individual incentive scheme improved test
scores by 0.27 SD in maths and 0.17 SD in
language. The group scheme increased scores
by 0.22 SD in maths and 0.09 SD in language.
Spillovers raised scores in non-incentive
subjects too (from 0.11 to 0.18 SD).
Participatory and community management interventions
Jimenez and Sawada (1999) El Salvador (rural); Primary
(grade 3)
Foreign Aid and
Government
Quasi-
experimental
analysis
(structural
equation
modelling and
IV)
605 EDUCO’s Community
Involvement and
Decentralisation Programme
Language test scores increase as a result of the
decentralisation and increased community
involvement
Garcı´a Palomer and Paredes
(2010)
Chile (urban); Primary
(grade 4)
Government Quasi-
experimental
analysis(propensity score
matching and structural
equation modelling)
225,206 (structural equation)
546 (PSM)
Low income students’
attendance of private
subsidised SIP schools which
implement best practice and
management standards
Maths test scores increase
by about 32 points in SIP
schools as a result of good
management practices
Di Gropello and Marshall
(2005)
Honduras (rural); Primary
(grade 3)
Government Quasi-
experimental
analysis
(structural
equation
model)
975 Community school
participation programme
(PROHECO)
10% point average increase in the percentage of
correct answers for Spanish, maths and science
exams
King and Ozler (2005) Nicaragua (nation-wide);
Primary and Secondary
(grade 4 and 10)
Government Cross-sectional
and IV Analysis
945 (primary)
911(secondary)
Decentralisation of school-
management reform
While ofﬁcial autonomy as a status does not
improve learning, when de facto autonomous
practices are considered, an increase in maths
test scores is recorded
Galiani et al. (2008) Argentina (nation-wide);
Secondary (grade 10)
Government Quasi-
experimental
analysis (D-i-D)
3273 Decentralisation of secondary
school system
Test score increased by 3.5% for maths and 5.4%
in language, but the gains did not reach the
poorest students
Lassibille et al. (2010) Madagascar (urban and
rural); Primary (grade 3–5)
Government RCT 22,000 Improvement of school
management practices at
various levels of
decentralisation
Management practices were improved only
when the intervention was implemented at all
decentralisation levels (that is, when school
level implementation complemented district
and sub-district implementation), but the
impact on test scores was insigniﬁcant
Source: Authors.
a The study is recorded twice in order to separate the resource provision from the behavioural incentive component of the intervention.
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